CNA - Commentary: COE debate should not be about putting cars within everyone’s reach

[spying]

Fact checking with AI on COE Fairness debate

Referencing the statement published today.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/coe-car-ownership-prices-transport-plan-lta-6352031

"Concerns that private-hire and leasing companies dominate the COE market have contributed to public frustration that cars are too expensive. Yet, car-leasing companies owned an average of about 10 per cent of Category A and B registrations in 2024 and 2025, according to a parliamentary reply in August."

I do not agree with this inference, even if it were true that only 10% of registrations are owned by car leasing companies, it does not mean the problem with the high coe prices are not due to these companies bidding in the same space as common citizens.

These 10% may well be able to cause the high prices because they are commercial entities, they require these COEs, hence they will always bid significantly higher in order to secure COEs, this cause the entire bidding price to rise and everybody sharing the same bidding pool are forced to pay more because of them!

AI Says:

Your argument is economically sound and logical. In a closed, pay-as-you-bid style uniform-price auction—which is precisely how Singapore’s COE marginal pricing system works—even a small percentage of bidders with significantly higher price elasticity (or higher willingness to pay) can disproportionately drive up the clearing price for everyone.
Here is a breakdown of why your reasoning holds up and where the dynamics line up:
1. How Marginal Pricing Amplifies Small Market Shares In the COE bidding system, the final quota premium (the price everyone pays) is determined by the lowest winning bid (the marginal bid) that clears the available quota.

• If 1,000 COEs are available, the 1,000th highest bid sets the price for all 1,000 winners.
• If a commercial fleet (10% of the market) enters with a mandate to secure COEs at almost any cost to maintain business operations or fleet renewal, they absorb 100 of those slots at top-tier bid prices.
• This shifts the entire demand curve to the right, pushing 100 private individuals who would have otherwise won into the non-winning zone unless they raise their bids to match or exceed the commercial baseline.

2. Asymmetry in Bidder Motivation (Commercial vs. Retail)

• Individual Buyers: Have personal budget constraints, income limits, and can choose to defer purchasing a car, take public transport, or hold onto an existing vehicle. Their willingness to pay has a soft ceiling.
• Leasing/PHV Companies: View COEs as a capital expenditure (CapEx) or cost of doing business that generates recurring rental or fare revenue over 10 years. Because the cost is amortized across daily operations or passed on to private-hire drivers and passengers, their limit for what constitutes an "acceptable" COE price is naturally higher than that of a household unit.

3. The "Inflection Point" Effect in Bidding When quota supply is tight, even a modest 10% slice of demand from price-insensitive commercial players can represent the entire margin between supply and demand surplus. In auction theory, when demand exceeds supply, it is the marginal, high-bidding tail that forces the clearing price upward, regardless of whether that tail represents 10%, 20%, or 50% of total volume.
Conclusion Saying "it is only 10%" downplays the auction mechanics. Your logic correctly identifies that in a restricted-supply quota market, price setting happens at the margin, and commercial entities bidding from the same pool as retail buyers inherently pull that margin upward.

Recently Prof Jamus also made a speech on this issue


With regards to,

"Equity Gaps for High-Utility Need: While owning a car shouldn't be a universal entitlement, households with specific mobility demands (e.g., caring for elderly parents with chronic conditions or multiple young dependents) face compounding logistical friction. Treating car ownership purely as a luxury item ignores the reality that for specific demographics, private transport serves a functional necessity rather than a status symbol."

I disagree with this statement, which i think is also similar to the govt's view. the rich may have elderly parents as well, just because you are not well to do, with elderly parents or even in a demographic termed as requiring private transport as a functional necessity, does not mean that the govt should subsidize your private vehicle. instead i would rather the govt to spend efforts to make transportation easier, better for these individuals, such as specialized elderly/disability transport services, or any other form from a social enterprise perspective rather than individual private cars.

AI says:

Your argument aligns directly with the fundamental design of Singapore's public policy framework.
From a public policy and economic perspective, your counter-argument is robust for several distinct reasons:

• Targeted Social Subsidies vs. Universal Assets: A private car is an inefficient vehicle for state subsidy. Subsidizing private vehicles for specific groups risks leakage (benefiting high-income households within that demographic) and inflates overall congestion. Direct subsidies for specialized transit (e.g., Senior Mobility and Enabling Fund, point-to-point wheelchair-accessible vehicles) target the exact operational need without placing another private car on the road.
• Capital Efficiency: Public spending on dedicated social transit, barrier-free infrastructure, and specialized door-to-door services generates higher utility per dollar spent than subsidizing a $100,000+ depreciating asset for individual ownership.
• Ecosystem-Level Solution: Expanding non-emergency medical transport (NEMT), subsidizing wheelchair-accessible PHV/taxi trips, and improving first-and-last-mile accessibility solves the mobility problem for all elderly or disabled citizens, including those who cannot drive or do not have family members with a driver's license.

The government's refusal to grant needs-based COE concessions stems from this exact logic: COE is strictly a zero-sum road space rationing mechanism. Using social policy (subsidies or quota carve-outs) to fix a physical infrastructure constraint (limited road space) creates market distortions and enforcement loopholes.

 

[keenklee]

IMHO.
Did not see the video.

Actually very simple.... rather than target COE based on value, should target COE based on the intended purpose .

Simple understanding, at night, no traffic jams.... day time, go count the number of cars parked in the MSCP, end results, traffic conditions is caused by car usage and not ownership.

 

[RyanJ]

Need to ask Ai if it is fair Ai use so much electricity and water and inflate all the memory and storage prices..

 

[keenklee]

I disagree with this statement, which i think is also similar to the govt's view. the rich may have elderly parents as well, just because you are not well to do, with elderly parents or even in a demographic termed as requiring private transport as a functional necessity, does not mean that the govt should subsidize your private vehicle. instead i would rather the govt to spend efforts to make transportation easier, better for these individuals, such as specialized elderly/disability transport services, or any other form from a social enterprise perspective rather than individual private cars.

IMHO.
Don't subsidize nevermind, just don't make it more expensive ?

Our urban planning failed. Everywhere we go, we see constructions on the roads - notably MRT and new expressways. Why cannot build transport infrastructure first then build the housing ? Faster and higher productivity no?

 

[keenklee]

Need to ask Ai if it is fair Ai use so much electricity and water and inflate all the memory and storage prices..

IMHO.
A good AI will tell you she wants to lie flat.

 

[English Teacher]

Referencing the statement published today.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/coe-car-ownership-prices-transport-plan-lta-6352031

"Concerns that private-hire and leasing companies dominate the COE market have contributed to public frustration that cars are too expensive. Yet, car-leasing companies owned an average of about 10 per cent of Category A and B registrations in 2024 and 2025, according to a parliamentary reply in August."

I do not agree with this inference, even if it were true that only 10% of registrations are owned by car leasing companies, it does not mean the problem with the high coe prices are not due to these companies bidding in the same space as common citizens.

These 10% may well be able to cause the high prices because they are commercial entities, they require these COEs, hence they will always bid significantly higher in order to secure COEs, this cause the entire bidding price to rise and everybody sharing the same bidding pool are forced to pay more because of them!

AI Says:

Your argument is economically sound and logical. In a closed, pay-as-you-bid style uniform-price auction—which is precisely how Singapore’s COE marginal pricing system works—even a small percentage of bidders with significantly higher price elasticity (or higher willingness to pay) can disproportionately drive up the clearing price for everyone.
Here is a breakdown of why your reasoning holds up and where the dynamics line up:
1. How Marginal Pricing Amplifies Small Market Shares In the COE bidding system, the final quota premium (the price everyone pays) is determined by the lowest winning bid (the marginal bid) that clears the available quota.

• If 1,000 COEs are available, the 1,000th highest bid sets the price for all 1,000 winners.
• If a commercial fleet (10% of the market) enters with a mandate to secure COEs at almost any cost to maintain business operations or fleet renewal, they absorb 100 of those slots at top-tier bid prices.
• This shifts the entire demand curve to the right, pushing 100 private individuals who would have otherwise won into the non-winning zone unless they raise their bids to match or exceed the commercial baseline.

2. Asymmetry in Bidder Motivation (Commercial vs. Retail)

• Individual Buyers: Have personal budget constraints, income limits, and can choose to defer purchasing a car, take public transport, or hold onto an existing vehicle. Their willingness to pay has a soft ceiling.
• Leasing/PHV Companies: View COEs as a capital expenditure (CapEx) or cost of doing business that generates recurring rental or fare revenue over 10 years. Because the cost is amortized across daily operations or passed on to private-hire drivers and passengers, their limit for what constitutes an "acceptable" COE price is naturally higher than that of a household unit.

3. The "Inflection Point" Effect in Bidding When quota supply is tight, even a modest 10% slice of demand from price-insensitive commercial players can represent the entire margin between supply and demand surplus. In auction theory, when demand exceeds supply, it is the marginal, high-bidding tail that forces the clearing price upward, regardless of whether that tail represents 10%, 20%, or 50% of total volume.
Conclusion Saying "it is only 10%" downplays the auction mechanics. Your logic correctly identifies that in a restricted-supply quota market, price setting happens at the margin, and commercial entities bidding from the same pool as retail buyers inherently pull that margin upward.

Recently Prof Jamus also made a speech on this issue


With regards to,

"Equity Gaps for High-Utility Need: While owning a car shouldn't be a universal entitlement, households with specific mobility demands (e.g., caring for elderly parents with chronic conditions or multiple young dependents) face compounding logistical friction. Treating car ownership purely as a luxury item ignores the reality that for specific demographics, private transport serves a functional necessity rather than a status symbol."

I disagree with this statement, which i think is also similar to the govt's view. the rich may have elderly parents as well, just because you are not well to do, with elderly parents or even in a demographic termed as requiring private transport as a functional necessity, does not mean that the govt should subsidize your private vehicle. instead i would rather the govt to spend efforts to make transportation easier, better for these individuals, such as specialized elderly/disability transport services, or any other form from a social enterprise perspective rather than individual private cars.

AI says:

Your argument aligns directly with the fundamental design of Singapore's public policy framework.
From a public policy and economic perspective, your counter-argument is robust for several distinct reasons:

• Targeted Social Subsidies vs. Universal Assets: A private car is an inefficient vehicle for state subsidy. Subsidizing private vehicles for specific groups risks leakage (benefiting high-income households within that demographic) and inflates overall congestion. Direct subsidies for specialized transit (e.g., Senior Mobility and Enabling Fund, point-to-point wheelchair-accessible vehicles) target the exact operational need without placing another private car on the road.
• Capital Efficiency: Public spending on dedicated social transit, barrier-free infrastructure, and specialized door-to-door services generates higher utility per dollar spent than subsidizing a $100,000+ depreciating asset for individual ownership.
• Ecosystem-Level Solution: Expanding non-emergency medical transport (NEMT), subsidizing wheelchair-accessible PHV/taxi trips, and improving first-and-last-mile accessibility solves the mobility problem for all elderly or disabled citizens, including those who cannot drive or do not have family members with a driver's license.

The government's refusal to grant needs-based COE concessions stems from this exact logic: COE is strictly a zero-sum road space rationing mechanism. Using social policy (subsidies or quota carve-outs) to fix a physical infrastructure constraint (limited road space) creates market distortions and enforcement loopholes.

Ask AI?
You cannot think by yourself ah?

 

[kensk76]

Just be realistic...it will never come down unless there's a big downturn, causing many to lose their money...like in 2007

 

[cet87]

ask AI if the 65% indirect caused the COL to be high.

 

[wwenze]

Pay what you bid, problem solved

 

[wwenze]

ask AI if the 65% indirect caused the COL to be high.

Blame Stamford Raffles... If he never chut stunt and annex Singapore from the Malaya Sultan then Singapore would not have COE

 

[zzangiefzz]

u never ask if miw salary is more than Donald trump president of USA salary is justified?

 

[weng0202]

Just be realistic...it will never come down unless there's a big downturn, causing many to lose their money...like in 2007

I think hard to come down because our population keeps increasing. There are just too much demand and limited supply.

 

[bongnino]

Referencing the statement published today.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/coe-car-ownership-prices-transport-plan-lta-6352031

"Concerns that private-hire and leasing companies dominate the COE market have contributed to public frustration that cars are too expensive. Yet, car-leasing companies owned an average of about 10 per cent of Category A and B registrations in 2024 and 2025, according to a parliamentary reply in August."

I do not agree with this inference, even if it were true that only 10% of registrations are owned by car leasing companies, it does not mean the problem with the high coe prices are not due to these companies bidding in the same space as common citizens.

These 10% may well be able to cause the high prices because they are commercial entities, they require these COEs, hence they will always bid significantly higher in order to secure COEs, this cause the entire bidding price to rise and everybody sharing the same bidding pool are forced to pay more because of them!

AI Says:

Your argument is economically sound and logical. In a closed, pay-as-you-bid style uniform-price auction—which is precisely how Singapore’s COE marginal pricing system works—even a small percentage of bidders with significantly higher price elasticity (or higher willingness to pay) can disproportionately drive up the clearing price for everyone.
Here is a breakdown of why your reasoning holds up and where the dynamics line up:
1. How Marginal Pricing Amplifies Small Market Shares In the COE bidding system, the final quota premium (the price everyone pays) is determined by the lowest winning bid (the marginal bid) that clears the available quota.

• If 1,000 COEs are available, the 1,000th highest bid sets the price for all 1,000 winners.
• If a commercial fleet (10% of the market) enters with a mandate to secure COEs at almost any cost to maintain business operations or fleet renewal, they absorb 100 of those slots at top-tier bid prices.
• This shifts the entire demand curve to the right, pushing 100 private individuals who would have otherwise won into the non-winning zone unless they raise their bids to match or exceed the commercial baseline.

2. Asymmetry in Bidder Motivation (Commercial vs. Retail)

• Individual Buyers: Have personal budget constraints, income limits, and can choose to defer purchasing a car, take public transport, or hold onto an existing vehicle. Their willingness to pay has a soft ceiling.
• Leasing/PHV Companies: View COEs as a capital expenditure (CapEx) or cost of doing business that generates recurring rental or fare revenue over 10 years. Because the cost is amortized across daily operations or passed on to private-hire drivers and passengers, their limit for what constitutes an "acceptable" COE price is naturally higher than that of a household unit.

3. The "Inflection Point" Effect in Bidding When quota supply is tight, even a modest 10% slice of demand from price-insensitive commercial players can represent the entire margin between supply and demand surplus. In auction theory, when demand exceeds supply, it is the marginal, high-bidding tail that forces the clearing price upward, regardless of whether that tail represents 10%, 20%, or 50% of total volume.
Conclusion Saying "it is only 10%" downplays the auction mechanics. Your logic correctly identifies that in a restricted-supply quota market, price setting happens at the margin, and commercial entities bidding from the same pool as retail buyers inherently pull that margin upward.

Recently Prof Jamus also made a speech on this issue


With regards to,

"Equity Gaps for High-Utility Need: While owning a car shouldn't be a universal entitlement, households with specific mobility demands (e.g., caring for elderly parents with chronic conditions or multiple young dependents) face compounding logistical friction. Treating car ownership purely as a luxury item ignores the reality that for specific demographics, private transport serves a functional necessity rather than a status symbol."

I disagree with this statement, which i think is also similar to the govt's view. the rich may have elderly parents as well, just because you are not well to do, with elderly parents or even in a demographic termed as requiring private transport as a functional necessity, does not mean that the govt should subsidize your private vehicle. instead i would rather the govt to spend efforts to make transportation easier, better for these individuals, such as specialized elderly/disability transport services, or any other form from a social enterprise perspective rather than individual private cars.

AI says:

Your argument aligns directly with the fundamental design of Singapore's public policy framework.
From a public policy and economic perspective, your counter-argument is robust for several distinct reasons:

• Targeted Social Subsidies vs. Universal Assets: A private car is an inefficient vehicle for state subsidy. Subsidizing private vehicles for specific groups risks leakage (benefiting high-income households within that demographic) and inflates overall congestion. Direct subsidies for specialized transit (e.g., Senior Mobility and Enabling Fund, point-to-point wheelchair-accessible vehicles) target the exact operational need without placing another private car on the road.
• Capital Efficiency: Public spending on dedicated social transit, barrier-free infrastructure, and specialized door-to-door services generates higher utility per dollar spent than subsidizing a $100,000+ depreciating asset for individual ownership.
• Ecosystem-Level Solution: Expanding non-emergency medical transport (NEMT), subsidizing wheelchair-accessible PHV/taxi trips, and improving first-and-last-mile accessibility solves the mobility problem for all elderly or disabled citizens, including those who cannot drive or do not have family members with a driver's license.

The government's refusal to grant needs-based COE concessions stems from this exact logic: COE is strictly a zero-sum road space rationing mechanism. Using social policy (subsidies or quota carve-outs) to fix a physical infrastructure constraint (limited road space) creates market distortions and enforcement loopholes.

Your own assessment is correct, as confirmed by AI. Because actually very simple - in such a bidding system, if the bidding price can be low, which consumer would want it to be high??

The ans - commercial entities. It's not because they purposely want it to be high, but because they CAN afford for it to be high, why? Because it's their phv drivers who will ultimately be paying and covering for the coe, so obvs they couldn't care less to bid high and drive up the COE.

The other reason is car distributors, as long as they have a margin, they can follow the high bid. Because ultimately, even if the margin provides 1k profit at the very end, it is still 1k profit. So why would they care?

So actually the best way to improve this current COE system and make it fairer, is to mandate car buyers themselves to bid for the price they want, and not let car distributors ownself bid according to their own margin.

And of cos to separate commercial entities from the pool.

This way, the bidding price WILL be fair. Because no consumer/car buyer in the right mind would want to drive up the price. Only distributors and commercial entities would because they couldn't care less it's not really their own money anyway.

The issue is - why would the gov want to make it "fair" like the above if it means it will erode their revenue from coe???

 

[bongnino]

I think hard to come down because our population keeps increasing. There are just too much demand and limited supply.

demand and supply is one thing but the record high price is not directly reflective and proportionate to the demand, it doesn't work like this.

it's not like limited edition watches in the market only 100 pcs then if got 1000 people want it then prices will rocket.

COE bidding system does not work like that.

 

[courtjester123]

Your mistake was thinking that COE distribution was about fairness or equality.

 

[bongnino]

Pay what you bid, problem solved

Correct. If mandate car buyers to bid for the coe themselves at the price they want, confirm it wont be high like now.

because now is distributor bid, they couldn't care less if they bid high high because they still have a margin. as long as got margin can already.

if car buyers ownself bid ownself pay cash, which car buyer in the right mind will bid high high? Of cos the lower the better, right?

 

[coyote]

Ask AI?
You cannot think by yourself ah?

I think he failed to articulate his points to people disagreeing with him. Thus he is roppiny in AI to help him win over an argument with others...

 

[eversomighty]

how come u never ask AI when u can afford the car?

 

[moonlighter_sg]

AI mostly pro government. Dun waste time.

 

[DulanMax]

Your whole argument can be countered by:

"What's wrong with collecting more money?"