Inside scoop on Lee family and Associates – Fact or Fiction?

Ruoxi2001

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THE PAN-EL AFFAIR

In the mid ’80s, the Pan-El Group, consisting of Pan Electric Industries, Growth International Holdings, and Sigma Metal, all of which were listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore, suddenly shot to fame, and at the height of its infamy nearly brought the collapse of Singapore’s financial system.

Malaysian politician Tan Koon Swan, who was President of its MCA, had, through his proxy, Tan Kok Liang (no relation), the Group’s financial director, been running the Group with an unseen hand. Many such operations are conducted in this manner in the past and probably are also currently still in practice. There is nothing wrong with such modus operandi as long as there is no transgression of any laws, or when expressedly deterred by qualifying rules applicable to the industry that has been the choice of operations.

The trouble was, the Pan-El Group went big time into a series of trading operations know as forward contracts. This terminology was used to describe trading activities of stocks and shares purchased from the market and then quickly re-sold before payment or settlement had been made. They give rise to multiple transactions based on one single original transaction and could potentially involve many more times the actual physical stocks and shares that exist based on the original source transaction (some form of short selling). In the legal sense, there was no physical collateral existence of the subsequent transactions because title had not yet past to the re-seller since payment had not yet been made. The second tier buyer would face tremendous risk unknowingly (because the transactions were done through the market, ie. SES, and he would not know who the seller is) in the event of a failure of delivery. The situation would become even worse if his purchase was under finance.

Through the Group’s purchases and re-sales to the market as well as cross-sales (intra company transactions) they created a giant bubble in the back-end market (settlement phase). They culminated in constituting a very portion of the overall transactions done on the SES. Banks and finance companies were holding on to floating charges of their corporate clients (buyers) based entirely on technical ground, with the potential possibility of ending up with no real physical stock upon failure of delivery. The SES and almost the entire stockbroking member community were held to ransom. If blame was to be apportioned, it was a regulatory failure with the danger building up without the supervisory authorities’ knowledge or intervention, much like the Madoff case in the US recently.

Though the whole trading system was at knife’s edge, as long as financial obligations were honoured when due, nothing would have happened. But as it turned out … Pan El defaulted on meeting its instalments on a loan of about $75m taken from Standard Chartered Bank, and this set the crisis into its first roll. The house of cards began to shake as brokers tried to unwind their position through forced sale which sent the market plummeting. There were simply too many outstanding contracts to be unwound, and everyone was staring at disaster in the face.

Where it had failed in its performance as a watchful eye when the storm was brewing, the MAS made up for this shortcoming by immediately ordering the suspension of all trading activities on the SES (the first time in Singapore’s history this was done). This was followed immediately by holding an emergency meeting between the SES and all its stockbroker member representatives, as well as the 4 big local banks.

MAS tabled a the motion for setting up an emergency contingency life-boat fund which all the stockbroking parties had to participate collective as a group. The total sum was $180m and the each individual participant was to provide a certain sum. The balance shortfall was then to be underwritten equally by the four banks present in the meeting. It was a fund designed to avert potential collapse of a couple of stockbroking houses that were over-exposed. The fund was designed for such a party to draw upon in the event of a financial blip when they could not perform their obligations when due (settlement of contracts took more than a week in those days, unlike the 3 days average presently under SGX).

Needless to say, it meant that goodie boys (those who were conservative and played by the books) were actually asked to contribute to a common pool to help the ones who got themselves caught in this financial debacle through their greed. However, there were dissent to MAS’ proposal. And principal among them was Wee Ee Chao of Kay Hian Securities (now UOB-Kay Hian). He did not agree that the more principled stockbrokers should have to help bear the cost of bailing out the adventurous ones who had got everyone into trouble with their greed.

Koh Beng Seng, the power behind MAS at that time, brushed aside his “complaint” and dissent. Wee Ee Chao was noted to have used the proverbial spoilt child verse ” Do you know who my father is?” Koh Beng Seng’s reply was swift and it went something like “I don’t care who your father is. Just shut up and comply”. Now, that’s great deliverance. I believed Koh Beng Seng acted correctly at that point of time. There was a crisis brewing and it was time for action not debate.

Following all these, Tan Koon Swan was charged in court sometime in 1985 as a “director” for infringements under the Companies Act. So were his two lieutenants, Tan Kok Liang, and a Peter Tham (who held both directorship in the Pan-El Group as well as in stockbroker Associated Asian Securities, from which the transactions emanated). Even Alpha-Pacific Securities with Goh Keng Swee’s son (Goh Kian Chee) a director on its board came under the microscope (however the younger Goh was not charged in court).
 
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Ruoxi2001

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Why Mahathir is actually on talking terms with LKY

Although Tan Koon Swan was charged in court, legally speaking the authorities had very little legal leeward to plead their case. It all centred upon what is meant by the word “director” because literally speaking, based on semantics, Tan Koon Swan was not a director within the Pan-El Group. And it was difficult to prove that Tan Kok Liang was acting on his behest.
During this period something else was a storm was brewing up north in Malaysia. So, probably Tan Koon Swan could still maintain a smiling face because he knew the law and thought he would be “exonerated”.

Up north in Malaysia, a political storm was brewing, no thanks to Tan Koon Swan and his MCA. The political alliance of the Malaysian government, the Barisan National (coalition of UMNO, MCA, and the MIC) was shaking at its core. Tan Koon Swan was a rising star, and his charisma was jolting the land. Even the Malays were resounding for his meteoric political rise. If the MCA won the majority or a significant share of the next coming general elections, the balance of power shared in the BN would tilt and the UMNO will be threatened. He was seen by the then PM Mahathir as threatening the Malay ground. The ever strengthening MCA and its charismatic leader had to be put dowm. Mahathir’s sleepness nights had a saviour. It came in the form of the Pan-El Group.

So he made a visit to Singapore during that period, not for social or sightseeing purpose, but on a mission to save the advantage of balance of power in UMNO’s favour. There is no need to discuss what transpired between him and LKY. No marks to be given for guessing.

At first confident of his case being struck off without his defence being needed to be called upon, Tan Koon Swan began to feel uneasy with Mahathir’s visit and probably had a foreboding of some sort. He began to initiate a series of behind the scene plea bargain. In the end, an agreement was reached whereby he would be found guilty, convicted and fined several hundred thousand dollars. It was palatable to him, he had the resources to pay the fine. But not a jail term which would undermine, if not, finished off his political career back home.

At the appointed hour in court, he was delivered a surprise. Guilty plus a few years in jail. The Singapore government has reneged on its agreement with him. LKY had to decide between appeasing him (an upcoming political powerhouse but only with control over one third of the ethnic Malaysian population) or Mahathir (the current strongman of Malaysia, and in control of the government and the political party which had the support of half of the Malaysian ground, although not entirely the 100 % of Malay ground). He chose the obvious and the practical.

With that chapter, Mahathir had influenced the course of a judicial matter strictly under the jusrisdiction of our country, but inspired by political lobby of an external party. It was LKY scratching the back of Mahathir, and in time the visitor had to scratch back LKY’s.

So Singaporeans should not wander into extreme realms to believe all the spouting of anti-LKY vocals made by Mahathir all this while. That is for the public consumption of his Malaysian electorate. In reality, they work as closely together as ever all this while. Only slight technical glitches occur now and then on some of the outstanding unresolved matters, such as the water issue. But they can be overcome and resolved when the material time approaches.
 

ponpokku

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THE PAN-EL AFFAIR

In the mid ’80s, the Pan-El Group, consisting of Pan Electric Industries, Growth International Holdings, and Sigma Metal, all of which were listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore, suddenly shot to fame, and at the height of its infamy nearly brought the collapse of Singapore’s financial system.

Malaysian politician Tan Koon Swan, who was President of its MCA, had, through his proxy, Tan Kok Liang (no relation), the Group’s financial director, been running the Group with an unseen hand. Many such operations are conducted in this manner in the past and probably are also currently still in practice. There is nothing wrong with such modus operandi as long as there is no transgression of any laws, or when expressedly deterred by qualifying rules applicable to the industry that has been the choice of operations.

The trouble was, the Pan-El Group went big time into a series of trading operations know as forward contracts. This terminology was used to describe trading activities of stocks and shares purchased from the market and then quickly re-sold before payment or settlement had been made. They give rise to multiple transactions based on one single original transaction and could potentially involve many more times the actual physical stocks and shares that exist based on the original source transaction (some form of short selling). In the legal sense, there was no physical collateral existence of the subsequent transactions because title had not yet past to the re-seller since payment had not yet been made. The second tier buyer would face tremendous risk unknowingly (because the transactions were done through the market, ie. SES, and he would not know who the seller is) in the event of a failure of delivery. The situation would become even worse if his purchase was under finance.

Through the Group’s purchases and re-sales to the market as well as cross-sales (intra company transactions) they created a giant bubble in the back-end market (settlement phase). They culminated in constituting a very portion of the overall transactions done on the SES. Banks and finance companies were holding on to floating charges of their corporate clients (buyers) based entirely on technical ground, with the potential possibility of ending up with no real physical stock upon failure of delivery. The SES and almost the entire stockbroking member community were held to ransom. If blame was to be apportioned, it was a regulatory failure with the danger building up without the supervisory authorities’ knowledge or intervention, much like the Madoff case in the US recently.

Though the whole trading system was at knife’s edge, as long as financial obligations were honoured when due, nothing would have happened. But as it turned out … Pan El defaulted on meeting its instalments on a loan of about $75m taken from Standard Chartered Bank, and this set the crisis into its first roll. The house of cards began to shake as brokers tried to unwind their position through forced sale which sent the market plummeting. There were simply too many outstanding contracts to be unwound, and everyone was staring at disaster in the face.

Where it had failed in its performance as a watchful eye when the storm was brewing, the MAS made up for this shortcoming by immediately ordering the suspension of all trading activities on the SES (the first time in Singapore’s history this was done). This was followed immediately by holding an emergency meeting between the SES and all its stockbroker member representatives, as well as the 4 big local banks.

MAS tabled a the motion for setting up an emergency contingency life-boat fund which all the stockbroking parties had to participate collective as a group. The total sum was $180m and the each individual participant was to provide a certain sum. The balance shortfall was then to be underwritten equally by the four banks present in the meeting. It was a fund designed to avert potential collapse of a couple of stockbroking houses that were over-exposed. The fund was designed for such a party to draw upon in the event of a financial blip when they could not perform their obligations when due (settlement of contracts took more than a week in those days, unlike the 3 days average presently under SGX).

Needless to say, it meant that goodie boys (those who were conservative and played by the books) were actually asked to contribute to a common pool to help the ones who got themselves caught in this financial debacle through their greed. However, there were dissent to MAS’ proposal. And principal among them was Wee Ee Chao of Kay Hian Securities (now UOB-Kay Hian). He did not agree that the more principled stockbrokers should have to help bear the cost of bailing out the adventurous ones who had got everyone into trouble with their greed.

Koh Beng Seng, the power behind MAS at that time, brushed aside his “complaint” and dissent. Wee Ee Chao was noted to have used the proverbial spoilt child verse ” Do you know who my father is?” Koh Beng Seng’s reply was swift and it went something like “I don’t care who your father is. Just shut up and comply”. Now, that’s great deliverance. I believed Koh Beng Seng acted correctly at that point of time. There was a crisis brewing and it was time for action not debate.

Following all these, Tan Koon Swan was charged in court sometime in 1985 as a “director” for infringements under the Companies Act. So were his two lieutenants, Tan Kok Liang, and a Peter Tham (who held both directorship in the Pan-El Group as well as in stockbroker Associated Asian Securities, from which the transactions emanated). Even Alpha-Pacific Securities with Goh Keng Swee’s son (Goh Kian Chee) a director on its board came under the microscope (however the younger Goh was not charged in court).

miss out on the details... abt 18 trading and securities firms called to meeting over the weekend for that 180mil. almost like house arrest, never sign agreement cannot go home. then dunno where the money go.

and yes, the son of goh is involved in the scandal and ish bailed out with that money. nothing happened to him.

the doctor from the north was in sg several times discussing the arrest and charge of tan, who was the leader of MCA at that time. the doctor may have exchanged harsh words in public, but ish in secret pact with old fart when it comes to fixing opposition.

u scratch my back, i scratch ur back. this is actually a repay of kindness for msia assistance in coldstore.
 
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BrOwnTeddy

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Not a crime because no laws states that working with the enemy is criminal.
But the morality of it, and the fact that he is willing to do so, speaks volumes.
JB Jeyaratnam also.

Anyhow Hantam: Remembering Singapore's Lion of Democracy - J B Jeyaretnam (Part 1)

His (JBJ's) education like many was disrupted by WWII and his family evacuated to a Johor Bahru plantation and lived in a hut. He enrolled in Japanese classes/schools in JB and Syonan (Singapore's Japanese name) to further his studies as he put it - 'at the time we didn't know if this was truly the end of the British Empire'.

Having gained some proficiency in Japanese, he was quite naive when his Japanese tutor told him to follow him and start a Japanese class in Muar. He wanted to go, but his father put a stop to it and instead found him a job at the Census Dept. Later he moved on as an interpreter in the Transport Dept, when the Census Dept closed down. He was forthright in admitting why - at the time the Japanese started recruiting young men to work in 'the Death Railway' at the Siam-Burma border. Having a job meant that he wasn't likely to drafted in service at the notorious site. The job paid little but it gave him a chance to buy stuff like tapioca which became his family's staple food during the 44 month Japanese Occupation.
 

lordlad0

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THE DHANABALAN SLAPPING INCIDENT

After being elected in 1984 , LHL was appointed a second Minister of Finance (understudy to Richard Hu, the Minister in charge of the ministry). Richard Hu’s office was on the 43th floor of the Treasure Building off Shenton Way and LHL had his office a few floors below.

During that period, the “inner” cabinet used to have pre-meetings before the actual cabinet meetings where LKY would be present. It was at one of these pre-meetings that the slapping incident occurred. LHL had earlier gone to Richard Hu’s office to request for a certain file, and when told by RH’s secretary that her boss was not around, LHL demanded the file and took it with him without first obtaining verbal clearance from RH.

Later that afternoon when they were at the pre-meeting, RH chided LHL for his behaviour, that he was not showing respect to senior members of the cabinet. Present in the meeting was RH, LHL, Dhanabalan, Dr Tony Tan, Yeo Ning Hong, and Deputy PM Goh Chok Tong. LHL brushed off RH’s criticism, to which Dr Tony Tan was the first to come to RH’s assistance, telling LHL to be more courteous in his behaviour. Dhanabalan then joined in the fracas and agreed with TT. It was at this point LHL lost his cool and told Dhana off with some racist remarks. With sentiments riding high, Dhana countered by saying that LHL’s own sister also married an Indian, to which LHL reached across the table and slapped Dhana shouting “Leave my family affairs out of this”.

Dhana, TT and Yeo Ning Hong, then walked out of the meeting. It was at this point that GCK, hitherto a quiet spectator in the heated dispute, stood up and told LHL to stand down and that he would refer the incident to his father. The 3 ministers were then recalled into the meeting. TT and Yeo Ning Hing returned, but Dhana did not.

After GCK had reported the matter to LKY, the old man then forced his son to apologise not only to Dhana but the other senior ministers as well. All 3 mentioned ministers who left the meeting tendered their resignation to LKY (RH ate humble pie, continuing as if nothing happened). The old man persuaded all the 3 disenchanted ministers to re-consider their decision. Both TT and Yeo Ning Hong then agreed to rescind their resignation and continue their services, with the condition that LKY reign in his wild card son. Dhana told LKY that he could not continue but that he would stay on until the next general elections, upon which he would not be contesting.

Subsequently a few years later Yeo Ning Hong stepped down, and a while later so did TT.
this is abit hard to believe.
 

lordlad0

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there is no truth in any of it!!!
all are lies to smear pap...
i wouldn't say all are truth (or lies) but some are open-secrets that even the Lee family neither confirms (nor denys)...like how LHL first wife died and how LHL got married to Ho Ching 3 short years after the first wife's demise.
 
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