SIM UOL students lip lais! - Part 5

[popinjay]

For MA. Isnt the 4 management accounting techniques like a very vague thing? Basically anything we covered in MA is considered MA techniques what? No?

I wrote CVP, ABC, TQM and Capital budgetting. I hope it make sense cos all these are MA techniques?

So i feel that this question is sorta giveaway?

 

[ahjoex]

thanks for clearing that doubt. I wanna check out how the pyp is like. but vle don seem to be able to add elc in one of the course list?

you cant find it because ELC materials can only be found at "Law VLE" which is different from the EMFSS one we are using now. you will need to pay extra registration fee to have access to it. you can try going to the library to find the ELC pyp & commentaries? but i have no idea if they have it or not.

the paper have a combination of case studies and essays. choose 4 questions out of 8.

 

[M4tchb0X_]

Fighting people ~ especially those who are still having papers hang in there !

 

[runningman.snsd]

Micro people!

What section b questions you all focusing ah

 

[fishercow]

Micro people!

What section b questions you all focusing ah

Oligopoly and monopoly. Cost and production as well.

 

[ambersmear]

ME definitely easier than the later paper MA .. Just look at the number of people discussing about MA! Haha .. Only a handful mentioned ME.. Hope to get 60 and above!!!

so few ppl talk about ME i feel v insecure! haha

i did Q5 and 6.. shall write my answers here and see if it tally..cant rmb properly but its sth like this:

q1b) (out, (dont roll, roll)) and (out, (dont roll, dont roll))

q2) cournot
Qa=3.833
Qb=4.833
P=12++
profit(A)=20++
profit(B)=40++

q3) dominant strategy is to offer v+3=6.75 (i assumed "everyone knows the predator strategy is v+3..." means other ppl also wanna buy prey)

q4)
max to pay is 1/4(a-c+d)^2 - 1/4(a-c)^2

q5a) 10/6
q5c) 8.333
q5d) y=30+

q6) conditional input demand
L=(Qr/w)^0.5
K=(Qw/r)^0.5
cost function
TC=2(Qrw)^0.5
optimal quantity to max profit per worker:
Q=50-(w/2K)

 

[chiewy]

but theres no incentive for any of them to teach better. They all get the same pay. They can just put in minimal effort, just enough to get decent passing rate.

Agency cost of equity theory.


But having said that, there are some who are really dedicated. Raymond Teo (not sure whether he still teaching or not) , Mok Tian Soon, Nageb etc. Got quite a few.

Phil stephenson also dedicated. He is the only lecturer that provides solutions for all so many pyps and prelims up till the latest 2012. Even 2013 prelim.

I hope all my lecturers provide their own pyp solutions for their students. :l The commentaries sometimes really too shortcut/too chim or dont really say anything at all (eg audit). But at least ms chu's tutorial pack got till 2009.

 

[Blue Blood]

Daniel Tan is definitely bad la. People who can say he's good are probably those who can laugh at his annoying tryhard jokes (keep repeating the powerpoint is got power but no point thing).

Also like to keep harping on whatever teaching awards he got. Yes he really spend very long nagging and telling various useless stories. CF is more than just 21 lessons.. But you're getting much lesser than that with all those useless delays.

Also, he likes to assume that students knows this and that from PBF/POA for CF. But no, i took CF by using intro to econs as a prerequisite. Everything inside was freaking new to me. His lecture can only listen by you don't really learn.

Anyway to pay sim is just because you wanna have an easier time understanding and learning. I ended up studying the study guide and text myself and found it easier that way.

Btw good lecturers don't need to keep caressing their own ego in class one la, irritating as fug

 

[Blue Blood]

so few ppl talk about ME i feel v insecure! haha

i did Q5 and 6.. shall write my answers here and see if it tally..cant rmb properly but its sth like this:

q1b) (out, (dont roll, roll)) and (out, (dont roll, dont roll))

q2) cournot
Qa=3.833
Qb=4.833
P=12++
profit(A)=20++
profit(B)=40++

q3) dominant strategy is to offer v+3=6.75 (i assumed "everyone knows the predator strategy is v+3..." means other ppl also wanna buy prey)

q4)
max to pay is 1/4(a-c+d)^2 - 1/4(a-c)^2

q5a) 10/6
q5c) 8.333
q5d) y=30+

q6) conditional input demand
L=(Qr/w)^0.5
K=(Qw/r)^0.5
cost function
TC=2(Qrw)^0.5
optimal quantity to max profit per worker:
Q=50-(w/2K)

For me qn 1 i only chose, OUT.. Probably wrong already. Cournot answers are probably around the same as mine.
The rest kinda screwed up.

Qn5b how to get the $2.40? I couldnt get

 

[kiwichua]

For me qn 1 i only chose, OUT.. Probably wrong already. Cournot answers are probably around the same as mine.
The rest kinda screwed up.

Qn5b how to get the $2.40? I couldnt get

i think the equation is
1/6 U(100) > or = 2/6 U(100 - x) - 4/6 x
10 >/= 2 (100 - x)^1/2 - 4x
10 + 4x >= (100 - x)^1/2
(10 + 4x)^2 >= 100 - x

and so on lol
should be 2.4375 i think!

 

[Garlic & Butter]

let's not turn this into a bashing thread. i believe there are no "bad" teachers. they just have different style of teaching which you might or might not like.

the lecturers can only help to a certain extent. choosing the "more popular" lecturer doesn't guarantee good grades **especially msm

one lecturer i will bash n blast will be Philip Pang, teaching ISORG.
only go through half of subject contents in the last 4 lectures..
17 lessons spent on covering the essential text in depth, such as viruses etc all those

 

[Blue Blood]

i think the equation is
1/6 U(100) > or = 2/6 U(100 - x) - 4/6 x
10 >/= 2 (100 - x)^1/2 - 4x
10 + 4x >= (100 - x)^1/2
(10 + 4x)^2 >= 100 - x

and so on lol
should be 2.4375 i think!

so probability of
getting the '6' is more or equal to prob 5,6? i dont remember the question exactly already..

something like what is the max you'd pay for x?

 

[Garlic & Butter]

so few ppl talk about ME i feel v insecure! haha

i did Q5 and 6.. shall write my answers here and see if it tally..cant rmb properly but its sth like this:

q1b) (out, (dont roll, roll)) and (out, (dont roll, dont roll))
i put (out, dont roll). now i think of it, it is a perfect information, but a similar PYP question, the answer format was in te 2nd player only had one move, not 2, so not very sure.

q2) cournot
Qa=3.833
Qb=4.833
P=12++
profit(A)=20++
profit(B)=40++
same

q3) dominant strategy is to offer v+3=6.75 (i assumed "everyone knows the predator strategy is v+3..." means other ppl also wanna buy prey)

q6) conditional input demand
L=(Qr/w)^0.5
K=(Qw/r)^0.5
cost function
TC=2(Qrw)^0.5

SAME
optimal quantity to max profit per worker:
Q=50-(w/2K)
dunno how to do

bolded text^^

 

[kiwichua]

so probability of
getting the '6' is more or equal to prob 5,6? i dont remember the question exactly already..

something like what is the max you'd pay for x?

yes, but i think i rmb wrong. i think the sign is <= (less or equal to)

 

[ambersmear]

For me qn 1 i only chose, OUT.. Probably wrong already. Cournot answers are probably around the same as mine.
The rest kinda screwed up.

Qn5b how to get the $2.40? I couldnt get

for me, i stated to let x be a negative number, since you are paying that amount. i used the 2 different utility functions together by forming this inequality:

1/3(100+x)^0.5 + 2/3(x) > 10/6

in words, 1/3 is probability of getting '5' or '6'.
(100+x) is the payoff if you get '5' or '6'. note the '+' sign before x means adding a negative number (i.e. paying x) i used the first utility function for this cos logically 100+x should still be more than 0
2/3 is probability of NOT getting '5' or '6'.
But you will still have to pay x. since x is a negative, i used the 2nd utility function
RHS of the inequality is answer from part (a)

so after solving, will have a square equation.. using x=-b+-((b2-4ac))^0.5/2a, i will get a positive number n negative. reject the POSITIVE since i stated x is negative. that answer will be ~-2.40

 

[Garlic & Butter]

i think ME qns1 is similar to 2010ZB Q2:
this is also a perfect info non-simultaneous move qns rite? but the answer shows that of imperfect types

 

[Sneijder8]

so few ppl talk about ME i feel v insecure! haha

i did Q5 and 6.. shall write my answers here and see if it tally..cant rmb properly but its sth like this:

q1b) (out, (dont roll, roll)) and (out, (dont roll, dont roll))

q2) cournot
Qa=3.833
Qb=4.833
P=12++
profit(A)=20++
profit(B)=40++

q3) dominant strategy is to offer v+3=6.75 (i assumed "everyone knows the predator strategy is v+3..." means other ppl also wanna buy prey)

q4)
max to pay is 1/4(a-c+d)^2 - 1/4(a-c)^2

q5a) 10/6
q5c) 8.333
q5d) y=30+

q6) conditional input demand
L=(Qr/w)^0.5
K=(Qw/r)^0.5
cost function
TC=2(Qrw)^0.5
optimal quantity to max profit per worker:
Q=50-(w/2K)

^Anyone knows what is the objective function for this one?

I got a numerical answer, can't recall if w and r values were given in that part of the qn.

 

[devil_loved]

qns 1. (out,dont roll)
qns 2. Qa is 3.83 Qb is 4.83 price is 12.66..
qns 3. best is offer v=4 expected profit is $1.5m
qns 4. ((a-c+d)^2)/4 - ((a-c)^2)/4 > = invesment
qns 5a. 10/6
qns 5b. 2.44
qns 5c. 10*5/6
qns 5d. 30+ forget exact ans
qns 6a L=(Qr/w)^1/2 and K=(Qw/r)^1/2
qns 6b TC=2(Qrw)^1/2
qns 6c Q=33.33

thats all my answer.

 

[ambersmear]

qns 1. (out,dont roll)
qns 2. Qa is 3.83 Qb is 4.83 price is 12.66..
qns 3. best is offer v=4 expected profit is $1.5m
qns 4. ((a-c+d)^2)/4 - ((a-c)^2)/4 > = invesment
qns 5a. 10/6
qns 5b. 2.44
qns 5c. 10*5/6
qns 5d. 30+ forget exact ans
qns 6a L=(Qr/w)^1/2 and K=(Qw/r)^1/2
qns 6b TC=2(Qrw)^1/2
qns 6c Q=33.33

thats all my answer.

Q6c how to get numeric answer? i just leave my answer in terms of w and K :/
and the method is it use d(profit)/dL ?

 

[ambersmear]

^Anyone knows what is the objective function for this one?

I got a numerical answer, can't recall if w and r values were given in that part of the qn.

i used profit=PQ-wL-rK

then i d(profit)/dL =0 dont know whether correct to do this